Top-10 Picks – Analysis of a 10-Year Period
The 2012 level entry draft is fast approaching and this period will often generate substantial trading activity in fantasy pools. With all the hype associated with the draft, it is often difficult to remain objective in the evaluation of the top draft picks and in setting expectations in terms of potential future production.
By reviewing the performance of players that were drafted in the top-10 between the 1999 entry draft and the 2008 draft, we hope to establish some clear trends that may help any GM in determining the value of a high pick at the draft.
For the purpose of this analysis, players are categorized as follows based on their achieved production in any given year:
- Star Player: 80+ points for a forward, 50+ points for a defenseman, 40+ wins for a goalie
- Core Player: 70+ points for a forward, 40+ points for a defenseman, 30+ wins for a goalie
- Fantasy Relevant Player: 60+ points for a forward, 30+ points for a defenseman, 20+ wins for a goalie
This analysis is strictly based on absolute numbers and cold hard facts. It does not take into consideration perceived value, missed opportunities due to injuries or peripheral statistics. The purpose of this analysis is to assist in qualifying the value of a high draft pick, not to evaluate the career of the draftees. That is the reason why draftees are categorized on their achieved production in any given year (as opposed to their career production) with the assumption that, under the right circumstances, these players can replicate the same production.
All this being considered, below are the findings of this analysis and the conclusions that may be drawn from it.
a) Players selected in the top-3 are gold?
The top draftees of each year are often touted as the most gifted players of their draft class, often being in a class of their own. But to what extent is a top-3 draft pick more likely to turn into a star player than its pears selected a few ranks below?
Of all players that were selected in the top-3, 46%(14 out of 30) of them have achieved a star player-like production at least once in their career. Out of these players, 86% (12 out of 14) have achieved that level of production at least twice and 64% (9 out of 14) three times or more.
This success rate falls off dramatically when we look at the 70 players that were drafted between the 4th and 10th positions in the reviewed period. Only six of them have generated a production worthy of a star player (of which only two players – Nicklas Backstrom and Dion Phaneuf – have to this date achieved that production level more than once).
In other words, if the fact that 46% of the top-3 players have achieved stardom seems a low figure, it is still a very good probability when we consider that only 9% of the draftees selected behind them in the top-10 will be stars. What is even more revealing is that only three forwards in that group of 70 players (Nicklas Backstrom, Phil Kessel and Thomas Vanek) have had at least one season of over 80 points, which shows how unlikely a high draft pick outside of the top-3 is of generating a high-end point producer for your team.
Conclusions:
(1) Not surprisingly, holding a pick in the top-3 is your best bet at selecting a star in the making. The value of these picks is very significantly higher than a pick between 4th and 10th position.
(2) If you have a top-3 pick, it is probably not a good idea to trade down with the expectation that the player you will be choosing a few ranks below have a similar upside.
b) Shooting for the stars is nice, but what about core players?
Having elite player on your team certainly help winning your pool, but commons sense suggests that a GM cannot win without depth. A sizeable group of core player is generally necessary to overcome your opponents.
There were 100 players drafted in the period that was reviewed. From this group, over half of them (53 out of 100) have never been fantasy relevant for even a single season in the NHL.
Out of these fantasy relevant draftees, 68% of them (32 out of 47) have had at least one season where they have produced at a core level. In other words, if you succeed in selecting a fantasy relevant player in the top-10, there is a solid chance that this player can fit in the core of your roster.
Of course, drafting a player that has a strong chance of producing at a core-player level is nice, but consistency is even more important for these players. For the same group of fantasy relevant players, it should be noted that 60% (28 out of 47) have had a fantasy relevant production for a minimum of three years and 36% (17 out of 47) have produced at a core level for three seasons or more.
These figures are however based on the premise that you will be successful in selecting a fantasy relevant player in the top-10. The numbers are however less impressive when we look at the overall picture and we re-include the irrelevant players into the analysis. For the top draftees taken over that 10-year period, only 32% (32 out of 100) of them have had the production to qualify as a core player for at least one year, and 17% (17 out of 100) for three years or more.
But wait! These numbers include the star players selected in the top-3. If we strictly look at the players selected between the 4th and the 10th position, only 14% (10 out of 70) of them have had the production to qualify as a core player for at least one year, and a dismissive 3% (2 out of 70) has done the same for three years or more.
Conclusions:
(1) Selecting in the top-10 is a hit or miss exercise. If you are successful in picking a fantasy relevant player at the draft, chances are that he will be part of your core group of players.
(2) Do not overpay to acquire a top draft pick. If someone is offering you a core player for your fouth and sixth overall picks, then do not get blinded by the excitement of the draft period and accept the deal. To put things into perspective and if all other factors are considered equal, a GM would need to acquire all seven picks between the 4th and 10th position in return of his core player to make it an even trade.
c) That is all very interesting, but these numbers are incomplete.
The obvious criticism of the analysis performed above is that several of these players are still playing in the NHL today and therefore these numbers are not representative of their expected achievements over their career. As mentioned previously, the purpose of this analysis is to evaluate the draft picks, not the drafted players themselves.
Still, all the draftees in the reviewed period have had the opportunity to play in the NHL for four full seasons at the very least. When we look at the forwards that were able to achieve a star-like production, 73% of them (11 out of 15) have achieved that level of product at some point during the first four years following their draft year. Only the Sedins, Marian Gaborik and Phil Kessel have taken more time to achieve that production level. There may be a few players in the last few years of the reviewed period that will bring their game to another level in the future, but the trends established are unlikely to change. As such, the rates of success exposed above are likely to improve if the analysis is redone when all these players are retired, but not significantly.
All in all, although the analysis is not perfect for that reason, hopefully this 10-year period provides a portrait of the NHL that is more current, and as a result can more reliably be extrapolated to 2012 draftees than a review of the production of the players that were drafted in the 80s and early 90s.
Conclusions:
(1) Do not hold on your prospects forever. For every Phil Kessel who succeeds in achieving his potential somewhat later in his career, there are some Jordan Staals that always seem to be on the brink of making it to the next level but never quite get there, there are many Benoit Pouliots who are perennial underachievers and quite a few Pavel Brendls who only bring back bad memories.
(2) Take this analysis for what it is: a means of helping you to evaluate the value of a high pick. Do not discard its findings because of the potential slight variance of the overall results. If there is one thing that this analysis demonstrates unequivocally, it is that high picks beyond the top-3 are marginal assets when compared to the top ones.